In previous papers Pakes 2011, 2013) we analyze hospital referral choices for patients enrolled in six California health insurers that use capitation contracts to different extents. Our results indicate that patients enrolled in high-capitation insurers tend to be referred to lower-priced hospitals, all else equal, than other same-severity patients. We allow severity-specific hospital "quality" fixed effects to pick up perceived differences in hospital desirability conditional on the patient's diagnosis and severity on entry to hospital. We find that the trade-offs made 2 Under a global capitation contract the physician group is paid a fixed amount per patient to cover all costs of treating the patient (including hospital inpatient costs). Alternatively professional services capitation may be used, under which only the costs of services provided by the physician group are capitated. In about 90% of cases this type of capitation contract includes a "shared risk" arrangement, similar to the ACO "shared savings" arrangements, under which the physician group receives a share of savings made relative to a pre-agreed benchmark for hospital costs. between price and this quality measure do not differ significantly across insurers. Instead high-capitation, price sensitive insurers seem to send patients longer distances to access lower-priced hospitals than other insurers with no reduction in quality. We then use the price coefficients to back out bounds on the insurer, hospital, and severity specific quality terms. We find them to be highly correlated across plans: different insurers have very similar quality rankings of hospitals. We therefore add structure and That is, the trade-off between price and quality differs extremely little across the insurers in our data. In contrast the trade-off between price and distance does differ.
Highly-capitated more price-sensitive plans tend to send their patients further distances to obtain lower-priced service but do not tradeoff price against quality differently from other insurers.
II. An Analysis of the Quality Estimates
We now investigate the estimates of hospital quality that are uncovered in the analysis. Our model indicates that they capture all severityspecific hospital characteristics that affect the hospital choice other than price and distance traveled. We consider the (just under) 400 estimated hospital-severity specific quality terms that cover the highest-volume hospitals in the five largest markets (Los Angeles, Orange County, Inland Empire, the Bay Area, and San Diego) for the five aggregated "superseverities" defined in Ho and Pakes (2013 This variable was also used in Goldman and Romley (2008) . We take the weighted number of responses for each hospital and translate it to a market-level percentage: the percent of weighted respondents in the market who cited the particular hospital as having the best accommodations or amenities. We thank the National Research Corporation for providing the data.
our measure of hospital quality is associated with offering a neonatal intensive care unit, being a not-for-profit institution, and having positive patient perceptions of quality of amenities. The interactions with severity fixed effects suggest that all three characteristics matter more for sicker than for less-sick patients. Notice that just under half of the variation of our severity-specific hospital quality measures is not accounted for by these characteristics (despite the fact that we include both market and super-severity fixed effects).
This illustrates the need for hospital-and detailed severity-specific fixed effects in our main analysis.
[ Insert Table 1 Here ]
III. Counterfactual Analysis
We now consider what would happen if a low-capitation insurer adopted the preferences of a high-capitation insurer but held its hospital networks and enrollees constant. Note that we are calculating a "short-run" response.
Over the longer run we would expect capitation incentives to affect the networks chosen and the premiums, and therefore perhaps the characteristics of each insurer's enrollees.
Specifically, we consider the patients of the lowest-capitation insurer in our data, Blue
Cross. We assume that increasing the proportion of payments to Blue Cross physicians that were capitated to the level of another, higher-capitation insurer in our data would imply changing Blue Cross's utility equation to that of the other insurer (holding hospital networks fixed). We simulate Blue
Cross patients' hospital referrals when the preferences of other insurers are imposed. We summarize the increase in distance traveled for these patients and the associated change in price paid and hospital quality encountered.
The estimated coefficients from equation
(1) suggest that high-capitation insurers place a more negative weight on price relative to distance than do other insurers, but that the weight placed on price relative to quality is essentially the same for all insurers. This suggests that, as we change Blue Cross's utility equation to that of higher-capitation insurers, we should predict an increase in distance traveled with an accompanying reduction in price. The results, reported in Table 2 , are consistent with this intuition. We [ Insert Table 2 Here ]
IV. Discussion and Conclusion
There are three caveats to this analysis. within the ACO rather than to non-member hospitals. This would limit the cost savings generated through the mechanism we study, offsetting the beneficial effects of hospitalphysician integration. Our results suggest that this may be an important input into decisions regarding the structure of ACOs. Notes: Regression of estimated quality terms on hospital characteristics. See Section 2 for details. **: Signi…cant at the 5 percent level. *: Signi…cant at the 10 percent level. Notes: Predicted distance traveled (miles) and price paid ($) for Blue Cross patients under estimated preference equation for each insurer. distance and price = ave changes in these variables when move from BC to other-insurer preferences. Positive change = increase when move away from BC preferences.
